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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001) and § 78-2-2(4) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues for review in this appeal as set out in Appellants', Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds and Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds 
("Stichtings"), Opening Brief are argumentative, misleading and a contradiction of 
Stichtings' Docketing Statement. Accordingly, United Park City Mines Co., 
("United Park"), pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(b)(1), sets forth this Statement of 
the Issues in this appeal: 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HOLD, IN THE 
DISMISSAL OF STICHTINGS' COMPLAINT, THAT THE 
COMPLAINT WAS UNTIMELY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT, AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 
10-9a-801(2)(a)1, WITHIN THE THIRTY (30) DAY STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PARK CITY LAND USE MANAGEMENT 
DECISION, THE SUBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT? 
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HOLD, IN THE 
DISMISSAL OF STICHTINGS' COMPLAINT, THAT THE 
COMPLAINT WAS BARRED BECAUSE OF STICHTINGS' 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, AS 
REQUIRED BY U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(l)2? 
'The former Code designation, as noted in the District Court Opinion below, was 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-100l(2)(a) (2004). 
2
 Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1) (2004). 
Standard of Review 
A district court order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, Tf 8, 66 P.3d 592. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES / ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2)(a): 
Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or 
in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of 
the decision in the district court within 30 days after the local land-use 
decision is final. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l): 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under the authority of 
this chapter until that person has exhausted the person's administrative 
remedies. 
Park City Land Management Code, § 15-1-18 (C): 
Final action by the Planning Commission on Conditional Use Permits and 
MPDs may be appealed to the City Council. See Attachment 1. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves Stichtings' complaint/appeal filed on April 19, 2006 in 
the Summit County District Court, eleven (11) months after the May 26, 2005 final 
decision of the City Council of Park City and the May 25, 2005 decision of the 
Park City Planning Commission, both of which approved the Subdivision Plat for 
the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. Said complaint was filed by 
Stichtings alleging violations to Utah's Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act ("MLUDMA"). The complaint also raised for the first time the 
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claim by Stichtings that the May 26, 2005 decision of the Park City Council and 
the May 25, 2005 Park City Planning Commission decision violated Stichtings5 
state and federal constitutional rights and that Park City was liable for damages of 
not less than $5,000,000, attorneys fees and costs. 
Stichtings had filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court on June 22, 2005, 
raising only state law questions of statutory interpretation under Utah's 
MLUDMA. On April 11, 2006, the federal district court granted United Park's 
and Park City's motions to dismiss concluding that the complaint involved only 
quintessential issues of Utah state and local law. On April 19, 2006, while 
Stichtings' motion for reconsideration was pending before the federal district 
judge, Stichtings filed this complaint in Summit County District Court. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Order Dismissing Complaint 
District Judge Lubeck dismissed Stichtings' complaint on October 5, 2006, 
determining that such complaint was untimely and not filed within the thirty (30) 
day statute of limitations required under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-a-801(2)(a) of 
MLUDMA and further, Stichtings had also failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies before the Park City Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
a-801(l) of MLUDMA. 
From that Dismissal Order Stichtings takes this appeal. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Stichtings have not marshaled the relevant evidence and have, without 
record citation, set forth selective and misleading statement of facts. Therefore, 
United Park sets forth its own Facts pursuant to Appellate Rule 24(a)(7). 
1. MLUDMA Land Use Decisions of the Park City Council and 
Planning Commission. On May 25, 2005, the Park City Planning Commission 
gave approval to United Park's application (pending for 4 years) of the Final 
Subdivision Plat for the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side, which was a 
land development Plan of United Park and East West Partners pursuant to relevant 
provisions of MLUDMA. (R. 3A, ]f 14). The following day, May 26, 2005, the 
Park City Council accepted the Planning Commission's recommendation and 
granted final approval of the Subdivision Plat. (R. 3 A, f 15). 
Sec. 15-1-18(C) of the Park City Management Code ("PCMC") provided 
that final action by the Planning Commission on a Master Plan Development such 
as the Village at Empire Pass may be appealed within 10 days of the Planning 
Commission by a protestant to the City Council. (See PCMC § 15-1-18 (C) (E) 
(Attachment 1). While Stichtings "objected" to the Final Subdivision Plat before 
the Park City Council on May 26, 2005, they never exhausted their administrative 
remedy by appealing the Planning Commission's action or decision to the City 
Council. 
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2. MLUDMA Appeal Requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801(2)(a), (formerly 10-9-100 l(2)(a)), provides that any party adversely affected 
by a municipal decision under MLUDMA has thirty (30) days from the date of the 
City Council decision within which to file a petition for review in the district court 
where the municipality is situated. Further, Section 10-9a-801(l) of MLUDMA 
provides that no person may challenge in district court a municipal land use 
decision under MLUDMA until the person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
3. Stichtings Failure to Apply for Land Use Permission. The primary 
problem that afflicted Stichtings throughout the planning and zoning process 
before the Park City Planning Commission and City Council was that it never 
made any application or request for the planning or zoning of any of their property 
at or in the vicinity of United Park's Subdivision Plat at the Village at Empire Pass 
(Pod A) West Side. (Transcript ("Tr.") pp. 3, 11). Stichtings only objected to the 
development plan of United Park's property under the Subdivision Plat at Empire 
Village and its approval by the Park City Planning Commission and the City 
Council. (R. 3 A, ffl| 14, 15). Thus, no application for planning or zoning of any of 
Stichtings vast holdings, including the Marsac property, were ever considered or 
denied by the Park City Planning Commission or City Council. (Tr. p. 11). 
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4. The Federal Court Action. Rather than follow the state statutory 
procedures under MLUDMA of appealing the Park City Council's final approval 
of the Subdivision Plat of the Village at Empire Pass to the Summit County 
District Court and to exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing the Final 
Plat Approval of the Park City Planning Commission to the City Council, 
Stichtings filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for Utah on June 22, 2005 
raising only Utah statutory interpretations and alleged violations of MLUDMA. 
(R. 18, Exhibit 1). The complaint raised no constitutional questions, federal or 
state or other federal question issues. Id. 
After extensive briefing and oral argument, the Federal District Court on 
April 11, 2006 dismissed Stichtings' complaint, holding that the complaint only 
raised interpretations of State land use law under MLUDMA, "quintessential" 
areas of state and local law. (R. 18, Exhibit 2, p. 5). The ruling was that a federal 
court will not sit as a local land use or zoning board of appeal to review state-law 
issues involving municipal land use and zoning. Id. Stichtings belatedly tried to 
amend their complaint to raise a constitutional question but that motion was denied 
by the federal district judge. (R. 18, Exhibit 2, p. 3). Stichtings flatly 
misrepresented to this Court in their Docketing Statement herein that the federal 
court Order of Dismissal actually "transferred" the case from federal court to the 
Summit County District Court: 
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"Factual summary. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking review of a 
municipal land use decision in federal court. The U.S. District Court 
assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 then abstained, 
transferring the matter to the Third District Court. The District 
Court reversed the finding of jurisdiction, ruling the action 
untimely filed in State Court and held an appeal forbidden by the local 
code was a remedy requiring exhaustion." 
(Emphasis and bold added, Stichtings' Docketing Statement U 8.) Indeed, the 
federal court did not, in fact, "transfer" the case to the Summit County District 
Court and, in law, would have had no jurisdiction to do so. 
5. Dismissal of Stichtings' Complaint as Untimely and for Failure to 
Exhaust Remedies. United Park, joined by Park City, filed a Rule 12(b) Motion 
to Dismiss Stichtings' April 2006 complaint, contending that the complaint was 
eleven (11) months late and violated the thirty (30) day statute of limitations of 
MLUDMA. (R. 18). In the course of oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, the 
issue of Stichtings5 failure to exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing an 
appeal to the Park City Commission from the Planning Commission's approval of 
the subdivision plat of the Village at Empire Pass, was addressed and argued by the 
parties and considered by the District Court. (Tr. pp. 4-6). 
In its Order of October 5, 2006, the District Court dismissed outright 
Stichtings' complaint based principally on Stichtings' failure to file their complaint 
timely pursuant to the 30-day statute of limitations of MLUDMA, § 10-9a-
801(2)(a). (R. 102-107). Judge Lubeck recognized that the central issue on the 
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statute of limitations was whether Stichtings' filing of their federal complaint 
alleging statutory violations of MLUDMA tolled the 30-day limitation period. (R. 
103). The Court noted that "Mayflower offers no authority or argument for 
finding that 'the district court' [in § 10-9a-801(2)(a)] includes a federal district 
court and this court declines to interpret it in such a fashion." (R. 104). 
Moreover, the Court stated that with respect to the argument of possible "equitable 
tolling" "Mayflower does not cite a single case from any jurisdiction showing that 
filing in a federal district court that subsequently abstains from hearing the matter 
should toll the limitations." (R. 105). Indeed, the district court noted: 
"Indeed, Mayflower does not cite one case anywhere in its briefing in 
support of any of its arguments. Such lack of citation is surprising 
where Mayflower contends both the federal and state constitutions 
have been violated. It clearly does not make the Court's job any 
easier when one party does not support any of its assertions with 
appropriate authority." 
(R. 105-106, n. 2). (Emphasis added). 
The District Court then held that the phrase "district court" in the 30-day 
limitation statute of MLUDMA was not intended to mean a federal district court or 
a district court in another state. (R. 104). 
Finally, Judge Lubeck ruled that even if Stichtings' were somehow to get 
past the statute of limitations defense, Stichtings' complaint would still be 
dismissed because of its clear failure to exhaust administrative remedies as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l). (R. 108-109). Since Stichtings' 
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complaint involved the decision of the Park City Planning Commission as to 
Master Plan Development ("MPD"), Stichtings were obligated to administratively 
appeal the Planning Commission decision to the City Council of Park City before 
filing a complaint in the Summit County District Court. Id. 
6. Stichtings' Admitted Factual Allegations Under the Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion, Only for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the following pleaded facts 
of Stichtings5 complaint are admitted: 
a. Stichtings own lands within the municipal limits of Park City 
known as the Marsac claim; the Marsac claim approximates 
five (5) acres (R. 3 ,^6) ; 
b. The Marsac claim is part of an eighty-four (84) acre Mountain 
Village development zone (R. 3, lj 7); 
c. Park City asserts that only land which has been proposed under 
a development application filed by United Park would be 
entitled to be developed (R. 3, f 7); 
d. Historically the Mountain Village has been accessible by State 
Road 224 (R. 3,1] 8); 
e. In 2002, United Park, without permission from Stichtings, 
relocated part of State Road 224 bisecting the Marsac claim, 
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which relocation was thereafter dedicated to the Utah 
Department of Transportation (R. 3, |^f 9, 10). 
Other allegations of the complaint are non-factual and consist of argument 
and conclusions of law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Stichtings' complaint was dead on arrival when it was filed with the Summit 
County District Court on April 19, 2006. There are two reasons, both noted by the 
District Court in the dismissal of Stichtings5 complaint. 
First, the complaint was three hundred (300) days untimely and in violation 
of the thirty (30) day statute of limitations under § 10-9a-801(2)(a) of MLUDMA. 
Although Stichtings attempt in their Brief for the first time to redefine and give a 
totally different character and description of its complaint, it is beyond any debate 
that the complaint sought to appeal and attack the May 26, 2005 municipal 
decision of Park City's City Council and the May 25, 2005 decision of its Planning 
Commission giving final approval to the Subdivision Plat of the Village at Empire 
Pass, which decisions, it was alleged, violated non-discrimination sections of 
MLUDMA. 
The complaint violated the thirty (30) day statute of limitations of 
MLUDMA and was not tolled by Stichtings5 June 2006 complaint filed in Federal 
District Court raising only state law MLUDMA issues. MLUDMA sets forth a 
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comprehensive and integrated structure for land use and planning decisions of a 
municipality and the Utah legislature plainly intended that any complaint or appeal 
regarding a municipal land use decision was to a Utah state district court. That 
Stichtings did not do. 
Second, Stichtings failed to exhaust their administrative remedy of appealing 
the May 25, 2005 Planning Commission decision through a process that was 
specifically set out and defined in the Park City Ordinance § 15-1-18. Admittedly, 
it did not do so. Utah law, including § 10-9a-801(l) of MLUDMA, is unwaivering 
that a party who complains of a municipal decision on land use or planning must 
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. 
The District Court below correctly dismissed Stichtings' complaint on both 
of these grounds, either of which is sufficient for this Court to affirm on appeal. In 
this case, the District Court's Dismissal Order should be fully affirmed, it is 
respectfully submitted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT STICHTINGS' 
COMPLAINT/APPEAL OF THE PARK CITY LAND USE DECISION 
WAS UNTIMELY AND NOT WITHIN THE THIRTY (30) DAY 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 10-9a-801(2)(a) OF MLUDMA. 
1. Stichtings Acknowledge That Their Complaint is an Appeal From 
Land Use and Development Decisions of Park City's City Council and 
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Planning Commission of May 26 and May 25, 2005 as to the Subdivision Plat 
Approval of the Village at Empire Pass. Stichtings specifically allege in their 
April 19, 2006 complaint that they are attempting to appeal the May 25, 2005 
decision of the Park City Planning Commission and the May 26, 2005 decision of 
the Park City Council, both of which gave Subdivision Plat Approval to the 
Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) West Side. (R. 2, ^ 4). Stichtings' claim is that 
these land planning and use decisions violated Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-405(2) of 
MLUDMA, the Park City Land Use Ordinance, PCLMC § 15-7.3-4 as well as 
Article I, Sec. 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. (R. pp. 2, 3A-4, fflf 4, 17, and prayer.) While they are less 
candid in their Opening Brief only once mentioning violations of MLUDMA and 
then merely as an aside, (Applt. Op. Br. at p. 12), Stichtings made the alleged 
discrimination against them in purported violation of MLUDMA as the plain focus 
of their complaint. Admittedly, Stichtings filed their complaint in the District 
Court on April 19, 2006, eleven (11) months after the City Council and the 
Planning Commission had rendered their decisions. 
The threshold question is whether Stichtings' complaint, based on 
MLUDMA, is subject to the thirty (30) day statute of limitations provided in § 10-
9a-801(2)(a) of MLUDMA: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of 
or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
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review in the district court within 30 days after the local decision is 
rendered. 
Stichtings ignored this statute and instead, filed a federal complaint alleging only 
MLUDMA state-law claims. When the federal district court dismissed Stichtings' 
complaint, they then brought this complaint in Summit County Court ten (10) 
months after the statute of limitations had expired. Stichtings5 complaint herein 
was filed over three hundred (300) days late. The District Court properly 
dismissed it as time-barred. 
2. Stichtings' Federal Complaint Did Not Toll The MLUDMA 
Statute of Limitations. Stichtings filed their complaint in federal district court in 
June 2005 raising only state law MLUDMA issues and seeking redress under 
MLUDMA. No federal or state constitutional claim was made as noted by the 
federal district court in dismissing that state law complaint. Simply put, Stichtings 
selected the wrong forum. 
When faced with that determination before the District Court below, 
Stichtings, without so much as a single citation of precedent, argued that the term 
"the district court" in the limitations statute § 10-9-80 l(2)(a) meant the federal 
district court. The Utah District Court rejected that argument, concluding that the 
term "the district court," in the context of a "comprehensive state land use 
scheme," clearly referred to the Utah district courts. (R. 104). As the District 
Court stated, "Mayflower offers no authority or argument for finding that 'the 
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district court' includes a federal district court and this court declines to interpret it 
in such a fashion." (R. 104). 
The filing by Stichtings of its state law MLUDMA claims in federal district 
court was against a mountain of federal authority stating that federal courts will not 
sit as local land use and zoning boards of appeal. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 
256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Metro Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 
759 (2nd Cir. 1980). As Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit put it in Coniston 
Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988): 
This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the 
trappings of constitutional law . . . If the plaintiffs can get us to 
review the merits of the Board of Trustees5 [the municipality] decision 
under state law, we cannot imagine what zoning dispute could not be 
shoehorned into federal court. 
Id. at 467, brackets added. That is particularly the case where Utah has erected a 
complex statutory scheme under MLUDMA and provided avenues for appeal to 
the state district court. Creative Env't, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
While Stichtings have not raised the issue of equitable tolling in this appeal, 
the District Court examined that question at depth in its dismissal order, 
concluding that the doctrine was not applicable: 
Mayflowers' complaint filed in federal district court was filed under 
diversity jurisdiction and its sole cause of action was for violation of 
the Utah Code. Mayflower should have known that there was at least 
a possibility that the federal court would abstain from hearing the 
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matter in favor of a state court. Land matters are certainly 
traditionally state concerns. State courts are not forbidden from 
entertaining constitutional claims of discrimination either. 
Mayflower should have also known it was taking a risk where the 
limitations period was only 30 days. Nevertheless, Mayflower chose 
to take that risk and file in federal district court. 
(R. 107). 
Stichtings' complaint was time barred when it was brought ten (10) months 
after the statute of limitations had expired and United Park and Park City had 
proceeded pursuant to the final Subdivision Plat Approval of May 26, 2005. 
Stichtings' complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court. 
II. STICHTINGS' ATTEMPT TO AVOID IN THIS APPEAL THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER MLUDMA AND THE 
RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS CONSPICUOUS AND 
SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Stichtings appeal the District Court's Order of Dismissal without addressing 
the rationale of the Court's Ruling that Stichtings failed to file their complaint 
raising MLUDMA issues within the thirty (30) day limitation period of § 10-9a-
801(2)(a). Rather, Stichtings attempt to turn the issue on its head by arguing that 
3
 Just as in their brief to the District Court, Stichtings have totally failed to cite a 
single case to this Court from any jurisdiction demonstrating that filing a complaint 
in a federal district court which subsequently abstains from hearing the matter tolls 
a statute of limitations on state law issues. (R. 105). See Crank v. State Judicial 
Council 2001 UT 8, ^ 43, n. 17, 20 P.3d 307 (issues not "adequately brief[ed] . . . 
before the trial court" are not preserved for appeal and will not be considered); see 
also Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, U 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("issues . . . that were not 
presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by 
the appellate court."). 
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the District Court Order construes the state limitations statute to "limit the 
jurisdiction of federal courts" in diversity cases. Applts.5 Br. at 9. Initially 
Stichtings in their Docketing Statement before this Court, recklessly contended that 
the federal district court first assumed jurisdiction of Stichtings' complaint, "then 
abstained, transferring the matter to the Third District Court". Stichtings then 
made the frivolous contention that District Judge Lubeck "reversed the finding of 
jurisdiction" of the federal court. See Dock. Stmt, f^ 8. That contention, made 
subject to the provisions of Appellate Rule 33(b), is false and can not have been 
made in good faith. 
Stichtings5 studied avoidance of the District Court Dismissal Order will not 
work. The lower court's Order did not even comment upon federal court 
jurisdiction or whether statutory review of a municipal land use decision by the 
state district court somehow "limited the jurisdiction of federal courts". The only 
authority cited by Stichtings in their entire appellate brief is on the unremarkable 
proposition that a state cannot alter federal court jurisdiction. Applts.5 Br. at 9-11. 
However, unlike all the cases cited by Stichtings, the Utah legislature, in enacting 
MLUDMA, did not require that al] actions against a municipality proceed in a 
Utah district court. See e.g. Mr. Garry v. City of Bethelehem, 45 F. Supp. 385, 386 
(E.D. Pa. 1942) (state law attempted to require every lawsuit against towns to 
proceed only in certain state courts). Rather, the Utah legislature merely set forth a 
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statute of limitations, as part of a comprehensive, state statutory procedure under 
MLUDMA to appeal a municipal land use, zoning or planning decision to state 
district court. That was the ruling of the district court below which Stichtings can 
not evade. 
The ruling of the District Court herein is plain and unmistakable. The Court 
held, consistent with plain legislative intent, that local, municipal land use and 
planning decisions under MLUDMA are to be appealed or reviewed in state 
district court pursuant to the MLUDMA statutory procedure. Arguendo, if 
Stichtings wanted to bring a complaint in federal district court on non-MLUDMA 
state law issues, it may well be able to do so, but the MLUDMA claims and actions 
stay in Utah district court subject to the statute of limitations of § 10-9a-801(2)(a). 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the Federal District Court decision against 
Stichtings referenced herein, the federal courts are not going to permit Stichtings to 
make them local zoning boards of review, because zoning and land management 
decisions are "perhaps the quintessential state activity." F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742, 767(1982). 
Stichtings' attempt to evade or ignore the District Court Order in this appeal 
should be rejected. 
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III. CONTRARY TO STICHTINGS' ARGUMENT, THE DISTRICT 
COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT STICHTINGS HAD 
FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
UNDER MLUDMA BEFORE FILING A COMPLAINT IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
The District Court correctly determined that Stichtings, in any event, are 
barred from pursuing their MLUDMA claims because they failed not only to 
exhaust their administrative remedies, but they failed to plead the exhaustion of 
remedies. (R. 107-109). The Park City Planning Commission made its decision 
on May 25, 2005 to give final Plat Approval to the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) 
West Side. Stichtings "objected" to the Planning Commission decision and, by 
Park City Ordinance, had ten (10) days within which to appeal that decision to 
Park City's City Council. The City Ordinance, PCMC § 15-1-18 provides that 
"Final Action by the Planning Commission on Conditional Use permits and MPDs 
may be appealed to the City Council" . . . "within ten (10) calendar days of the 
Final Action". Id. § 15-1-18( C),(E). Such an appeal "to the City Council" must 
be filed with the City Recorder. Id. § 15-1-18(E) and: 
Must be by letter or petition, and must contain the name, address and 
telephone number of the petitioner; his or her relationship to the 
project or subject property; and must have a comprehensive statement 
of all the reasons for the appeal, including specific provisions of law, 
if known, that are alleged to be violated by the action taken. 
Id. § 15-1-18(F). 
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Stichtings do not make even an attempt to claim that they exhausted this 
administrative remedy by an appeal to the Park City Commission, contending in 
their Brief that there uwere no administrative remedies to exhaust" and that 
Stichtings made an "objection" to the Planning Commission decision before the 
Park City Council. (Applt. Op. Br. At pp. 11-12). But making a "simple 
objection" is not compliance with the Park City Ordinance § 15-1-18 and it 
palpably is not an exhaustion of Stichtings' administrative remedies. They had ten 
(10) days within which to appeal to the City Council for a de novo review of the 
issues to be raised and argued in their appeal, but they failed completely to take 
advantage of the remedy.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l) (fundamentally identical to former § 109-
1001(1) cited by the District Court) states unequivocally that before a party can 
challenge in District Court a municipal land use decision under MLUDMA, it must 
exhaust all administrative remedies before the municipality: 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
4
 To the extent Stichtings attempt to rely on a letter from their counsel, Mr. Smay, 
to the Park City Council dated May 26, 2005, the letter does not begin to comply 
with the Park City Municipal Ordinance PCMC § 15-1-18. (R. 1, Exhibit "A"). 
The letter was not sent to the City Recorder, it fails to contain a "comprehensive 
statement of all reasons for the appeal, including specific provisions of the law, if 
known, that are alleged to be violated by the action taken." In point of fact, the 
letter is devoid of any language suggesting Stichtings are appealing anything, other 
than sending a letter to the City Attorney that they claim is an "objection" to the 
Planning Commission decision of May 25, 2005. 
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the authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have made it perfectly clear that 
legislative requirements that all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to 
resorting to the courts, will be strictly enforced. Patterson v. American Fork City, 
2003 UT 7, U 16, 545 P.2d 1150; McFadden v. Cache County Corp., 2006 UT App. 
256 *4 (unpublished, see Attachment 2). Stichtings fail to point to any part of the 
record suggesting that they complied with the mandatory exhaustion requirements 
of the Park City Municipal Code before undertaking an action in district court. In 
fact, the record shows that they did not. 
But Stichtings have a further problem that, in any event, undercuts their 
complaint and affirms the Dismissal Order of the District Court. Stichtings failed 
to even allege in their complaint that they had exhausted their administrative 
remedies in compliance with the Park City Municipal Code. That has long been a 
requirement in Utah law. See Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 
P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982) (affirming decision of district court, in part, because 
plaintiffs had failed to "allege that they have exhausted their administrative 
remedies"). 
Stichtings5 complaint merely alleges that the Planning Commission, on May 
25, 2005, "over the objections of plaintiffs, approved the subdivision of UPCM's 
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land adjoining the Marsac Claim . . . known as the Village at Empire Pass (Pod A) 
West Side." (R. 3A, ^ 14). That does not come close to the pleading required that 
Stichtings had exhausted their administrative remedies. The failure to plead 
merely underscores the failure to exhaust. 
"[Stichtings] have leap-frogged over the entire administrative process and 
sought immediate relief for their grievances in state court." Patterson, 2003 UT at 
% 17. The exhaustion issue having been brought up and raised at oral argument, the 
District Court was correct in concluding that Stichtings had failed to properly 
exhaust their administrative remedies before filing their complaint herein.3 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court Order dismissing Stichtings' complaint should be, for the 
reasons set forth herein, affirmed in all respects. 
5
 Stichtings erroneously argue that on the hearing on United Park's Motion to 
Dismiss, Mr. Smay "challenged defendants to identify any remedy not exhausted; 
they could not." Applts.' Br. At 12. United Park has searched the transcript of this 
hearing and has failed to find even the suggestion of a challenge by Stichtings' 
counsel in this regard. 
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15-1-21. NOTICE MATRIX. 
15-1 - 1 . SHORT TITLE. 
This Title shall be known as the Park City Land Management Code (LMC). 
15-1 -2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. 
The LMC is designed, enacted, restated and reorganized to implement the goals and policies of the Park City General 
Plan, and for the following purposes: 
(A) To promote the general health, safety and welfare of the present and future inhabitants. Businesses, and visitors 
of the City, 
(B) To protect and enhance the vitality of the City's resort-based economy, overall quality of life, the Historic character, 
and unique mountain-town community, 
(C) To protect and preserve peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and aesthetics of the City, 
(D) To protect the tax base and to secure economy in governmental expenditures, 
(E) To allow Development in a manner that encourages the preservation of scenic vistas, environmentally sensitive 
lands. Historic Structures, the integrity of Historic Districts, and the unique urban scale of original Park City, 
(F) To provide for well-planned commercial and residential centers, safe and efficient traffic and pedestrian circulation, 
preservation of night skies and efficient delivery of municipal services, 
(G) To prevent Development that adds to existing Geologic Hazards, erosion, flooding, degradation of air quality, 
wildfire danger or other conditions that create potential dangers to life and safety in the community or that detracts 
from the quality of life in the community, 
(H) To protect and ensure Access to sunlight for solar energy devices, and 
(I) To protect or promote moderate income housing. 
It is the intention of the City in adopting this LMC to fully exercise all of the powers granted to the City by the 
provisions of the Title 10. Chapter 9a of the Utah Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act. Utah Code 
Annotated. 1991. as amended, and all other powers granted by statute or by common law for the necessary regulation 
of the Use and Development of land within the City. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -3. CONFLICT. 
The provisions of the LMC are in addition to all other City ordinances, the Laws of the State of Utah, the Laws of the 
United States, and applicable common law. The LMC shall not supersede any private land Use regulations in deeds 
or covenants which are more restrictive than the LMC. Whenever a conflict exists, the more restrictive provision shall 
apply to the extent allowed by law. The City does not enforce private restrictive covenants, nor shall any such 
covenant have the effect of modifying the regulations herein. 
15-1 -4. DEFINITIONS. 
All capitalized proper nouns in the text of the LMC are defined terms. Defined terms are located in LMC Chapter 15-
15 . 
15-1 -5. ZONING MAP ADOPTED. 
The zoning map for Park City as adopted by the City Council and executed by the Mayor is the Official Zoning Map for 
Park City. Upon amendment to the Official Zoning Map, the Mayor shall execute a new map. or re-execute the 
existing map with the amendments noted thereon. 
15-1 -6. ZONE DISTRICTS AND ZONE MAP. 
In order to carry out the purposes of the LMC, Zoning Districts have been established as set forth in LMC Chapter 15-
2 and as identified on the Official Zoning Map. In interpreting the Official Zoning Map. the following standards shall 
apply: 
(A) The zoning boundary lines are intended to conform to existing Property boundary lines when not in a public Right-
of-Way, or to follow the center line of public Rights-of-Way. including prescriptive Rights-of-Way, unless the lines are 
located by specific dimensions, in which case the dimensions shall control. 
(B) Where the Zoning District lines appear to have intentionally divided a Lot or Parcel between two (2) or more 
districts, the applicable zoning for each portion of the Lot or Parcel must be determined by using the scale shown on 
the map. 
(C) There is no minimum Area or diversity of ownership requirement for a zone designation. Neither the size of a 
Zoning District may be used as evidence of the illegality of a Zoning District or of the invalidity of a municipal decision. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -7. AMENDMENTS TO THE LAND MANAGEMENT CODE AND ZONING MAP. 
All amendments to the LMC must be made in the following manner. 
(A) APPLICATION. An Application must be filed first with the Planning Department on a form prescribed for that 
purpose. The Planning Department, upon its own initiative or at the direction of the City Council, Planning 
Commission, or Historic Preservation Board may initiate an amendment as provided below. 
(B) H E A m N i S S ^ J E F ^ B E ^ L A N N l N ^ ^ The Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing on all 
amendments to the LMC. Notice of amendment hearings before the Planning Commission shall be given by posting 
notice in at least three (3) public places within the City and providing at least fourteen (14) days published notice in a 
newspaper of general circulation within the City. The notice must state generally the nature of the proposed 
amendment, land affected, and the time, place, and date of the hearing. Once opened, the hearing may be continued, 
if necessary, without republication of notice until the hearing is closed. 
(C) GACTION BY PLANNING COMMISSION Following the hearing, the Planning Commission must adopt formal 
recommendation(s) to the City Council regarding the matter before it. approving, disapproving, or modifying the 
proposal. If the Planning Commission fails to take action within thirty (30) days of the public hearing, the City Council 
may consider the matter forwarded from the Planning Commission with a negative recommendation and may hear the 
matter. 
(D) HEARING BEFORE CITY COUNCIL. The City Council must hold a public hearing on all amendments to the LMC. 
Notice of the hearings shall be given by providing actual notice or posting notice in at least three (3) public places 
within the City and providing at least fourteen (14) days published notice in a newspaper of general circulation within 
the City. Once opened the hearing may be continued, if necessary, without republication of notice until the hearing is 
closed. Following the hearing, the Council must approve, disapprove, or modify and approve the proposal before it. 
Recommendations of the Planning Commission are advisory only. 
(E) JOINT HEARINGS. At the option of the City Council, the hearings before the Planning Commission and the 
Council may be consolidated into a single hearing, provided however, that separate votes are taken by the 
Commission and the Council. The Commission vote shall be taken first. Notice for any joint hearing shall be given by 
posting notice in at least three (3) public places within the City and by providing at least fourteen (14) days published 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the City. 
(F) TEMPORARY OR EMERGENCY ZONING. The City Council may. without prior consideration of or 
recommendation from the Planning Commission, enact an ordinance establishing temporary zoning regulations for 
any part or all of the Area within the municipality if: 
(1) The City Council makes a finding of compelling, countervailing public interest; OR 
(2) The Area is unregulated. 
Those temporary zoning regulations may prohibit or regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of 
any Building or Structure or Subdivision approval. The City Council shall establish a period of limited effect for the 
ordinance, not to exceed six (6) months. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -8. REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER THE CODE. 
(A) No Building Permit shall be valid for any Building project unless the plans for the proposed Structure have been 
submitted to and have been approved by the Planning. Engineering and Building Departments. 
(B) No new Use shall be valid on any Property within the City unless the Use is allowed. 
(C) No Subdivision shall be valid without preliminary approval of the Planning Commission and final approval by the 
City Council with all conditions of approval completed. 
(D) Proposals submitted to the Planning Department must be reviewed according to the type of Application filed. 
Unless otherwise provided for in this LMC. only one (1) Application at a time, per Property, will be accepted and 
processed. 
(E) The Planning. Engineering and Building Departments review all Allowed Uses, Administrative Lot Line 
Adjustments and Administrative Conditional Use permits. 
(F) Projects in the Historic District and Historic Structures outside the Historic District are subject to design review 
under the Historic District Guidelines. " 
(G) Conditional Uses and Master Planned Developments are initially reviewed by staff and submitted to the Planning 
Commission for review, final permitting and approval. 
(H) Subdivisions and Plat Amendments are initially reviewed by the Planning Commission and submitted to the City 
Council for final approval. 
(I) Variances, Non-Conforming Uses and Non-Complying Structures are reviewed by the Board of Adjustment. 
(J) No review may occur until all applicable fees have been paid. Final approval is not effective until all other fees 
including engineering fees have been paid, and following applicable staff review. 
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*AI1 Applications are filed with the Planning Department. If the Planning Department is 
not the reviewing body (y), a staff member will make a recommendation to the 
appropriate decision making body (X). 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -9. ALLOWED USE REVIEW PROCESS. 
(A) An Applicant must file a Complete Application, using the forms established by the Planning Department, and 
include payment of all fees. On any Application to construct a Building or other Improvement to Property which is 
defined by this Code as an Allowed Use in the zone in which the Building is proposed, the Planning Department must 
review the Application to determine whether the proposal: 
(1) is an Allowed Use within the zone for which it is proposed, 
(2) complies with all applicable Development requirements of that zone, including Building Height, Setback, Front, 
Side, and Rear Yards, and Lot coverage; 
(3) respects Lot Lines of a legally subdivided Lot; 
(4) meets the applicable parking requirements; 
(5) conforms to the Park City Architectural Design Guidelines and/or the Historic District Design Guidelines, and the 
architectural review process established for that zone; 
(6) can be adequately serviced by roads, and existing or proposed utility systems or lines; and 
(7) pertains to land in which all tax assessments have been paid. 
(B) If approved by the Planning Department Planning Staff, the plans must be forwarded to the Engineering 
Department and Building Department. The plans shall be reviewed for Building Code compliance and Permit 
issuance procedures. Approval of Allowed Uses must be noted by the issuance of a Building Permit in compliance 
with the provisions of the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by Park City. • 
(C) If the Application does not comply with the requirements of the zone, the Planning Department shall notify the 
Owner of the project or his Agent, if any, stating specifically what requirements of the zone have not been satisfied, 
and also stating whether the project could be reviewed as submitted as a Conditional Use for that zone. 
(D) PI.SCLAIMER- No permit issued shall be valid if any of the criteria listed in this section has not been met. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -10. CONDITIONAL USE REVIEW PROCESS 
There are certain Uses that, because of unique characteristics or potential impacts on the municipality, surrounding 
neighbors, or adjacent land Uses, may not be Compatible in some Areas or may be Compatible only if certain 
conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
The Planning Department will evaluate all proposed Conditional Uses and may recommend conditions of approval to 
preserve the character of the zone, and to mitigate potential adverse effects of the Conditional Use. 
A Conditional Use shall be approved if reasonable conditions are proposed, or can be imposed, to mitigate the 
reasonably anticipated detrimental effects of the proposed Use in accordance with applicable standards. 
If the reasonable anticipated detrimental effects of a proposed Conditional Use cannot be substantially mitigated by 
the proposal or imposition of reasonable conditions to achieve compliance with applicable standards, the Conditional 
Use may be denied. 
The City must review all proposed Conditional Uses according to the following procedure, unless a subsequent 
provision of this LMC specifically sets forth an administrative approval process for a specific Conditional Use, in which 
case that section shall control: 
(A) PRE-APPLICATION CONFERENCE. An Applicant may request a pre-Application conference with the Planning 
Department to discuss the proposed Conditional Use and the conditions that the staff would recommend to mitigate 
proposed adverse impacts. 
(B) THE APPLICATION. An Applicant must file a Complete Application on forms provided by the Planning 
Department for Conditional Uses. 
(C) NOTICE/POSTING. Upon receipt of a Complete Application, the Planning Department shall provide published 
notice once fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing and courtesy mailed notice to Owners of Property within three 
hundred feet (300') of the proposal. (See S„eMQQJ„^J_-12,_N0TiC.E .) The Planning Commission shall conduct a 
public hearing on the proposed Conditional Use Permit and shall either approve, deny, or modify and approve the 
Permit 
(D) STANDARDS FOR REVIEW. The City shall not issue a Conditional Use permit unless the Planning Commission 
concludes that: 
(1) the Application complies with all requirements of this LMC; 
(2) the Use will be Compatible with surrounding Structures in Use, scale, mass and circulation; 
(3) the Use is consistent with the Park City General Plan, as amended; and 
(4) the effects of any differences in Use or scale have been mitigated through careful planning. 
(E) REMJEVy. The Planning Department and/or Planning Commission must review each of the following items when 
considering whether or not the proposed Conditional Use mitigates impacts of and addresses the following items. 
(1) size and location of the Site; 
(2) traffic considerations including capacity of the existing Streets in the Area; 
(3) utility capacity, 
(4) emergency vehicle Access; 
(5) location and amount of off-Street parking; 
(6) internal vehicular and pedestrian circulation system; 
(7) fencing. Screening, and landscaping to separate the Use from adjoining Uses; 
(8) Building mass, bulk, and orientation, and the location of Buildings on the Site; including orientation to Buildings on 
adjoining Lots; 
(9) usable Open Space; 
(10) signs and lighting; 
(11) physical design and Compatibility with surrounding Structures in mass, scale, style, design, and architectural 
detailing; 
(12) noise, vibration, odors, steam, or other mechanical factors that might affect people and Property Off-Site; 
(13) control of delivery and service vehicles, loading and unloading zones, and Screening of trash pickup Areas; 
(14) expected Ownership and management of the project as primary residences, Condominiums, time interval 
Ownership, Nightly Rental, or commercial tenancies, how the form of Ownership affects taxing entities; and 
(15) within and adjoining the Site, impacts on Environmentally Sensitive Lands, Slope retention, and appropriateness 
of the proposed Structure to the topography of the Site. 
(F) TRANSFERABILITY. A Conditional Use permit is transferrable with the title to the underlying Property so that an 
Applicant may convey or assign an approved project without losing the approval. The Applicant may not transfer the 
Permit off the Site on which the approval was granted. 
(G) EXPIRATION. Unless otherwise indicated, Conditional Use permits expire one (1) year from the date of Planning 
Commission approval, unless the conditionally allowed Use has commenced on the project. The Planning 
Commission may grant an extension of a Conditional Use Permit for up to one (1) additional year when the Applicant 
is able to demonstrate no change in circumstance that would result in an unmitigated impact. Extension requests must 
be submitted prior to the expiration of the Conditional Use permit, noticed and processed with a public hearing the 
same as a normal Conditional Use permit (CUP). 
(H) APPEALS. Appeals must be pursuant to Section 15-1-18 herein. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -11. SPECIAL APPLICATIONS. 
(A) MASTER PLANNED DEVELOPMENT (MPD) REVIEW PROCESS. Applications for MPDs shall be reviewed 
according to LMC Chapter 15-6. 
(B) VARIANCES. EXCEPTIONS. AND NON-CONFORMING USES. The Board of Adjustment must review 
Applications for variances, special exceptions and Non-Conforming Uses and Non-Complying Structures in 
accordance with the regulations set forth in LMC Chapter 15-9 . Such approval must be obtained from the Board of 
Adjustment prior to the issuance of any Conditional Use permit or Master Planned Development, or other approval by 
the Planning Commission or Planning Department All action on an Application shall be stayed upon the determination 
that a Board of Adjustment approval is required. 
(C) PLAT AMENDMENTS/SUBDIVISION. Plat Amendments and Subdivisions must be reviewed pursuant to LMC 
Chapter 15-7. No Building Permit may be issued prior to such an approval. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -12. NOTICE. 
Notice of a public hearing before the City Council, Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment, and Historic District 
Commission must be provided in accordance with this section. All notices, unless otherwise specified in this Code or 
State law, must describe the proposed action affecting the subject Property or modification to the Park City General 
Ran, and the time, place and date set for public hearing on the matter. Notice shall be given according to 15-1-20 
Notice Matrix and as follows: 
(A) POSTED NOTICES. The Community Development Department must post notice on the Property affected by the 
Application and on the City's official website or in at least three (3) public locations within the municipality. 
(B) PUBLISHED NOTICE. Published notice shall be given by publication in a newspaper having general circulation in 
Park City. 
(C) COURTESY NOTICE As a courtesy to adjacent Property Owners the Applicant must provide the Planning 
Department with stamped and pre-addressed envelopes for each Owner of record of each Parcel located entirely or 
partly within three hundred feet (300') from all Property Lines of the subject Property together with a mailing list for 
those Owners The addresses for adjacent Owners must be as shown on the most recently available Summit County 
tax assessment rolls If the subject Property is a Condominium, the Owners Association is sufficient in lieu of the 
address for each unit Owner Courtesy notice is not a legal requirement and any defect in courtesy notice shall not 
affect or invalidate any heanng or action by the City Council or any Board or Commission 
(D) APPLICANT NOTICE For each land Use Application the Planning Department must notify the Applicant of the 
date, time and place of each public heanng and public meeting to consider the Application and of any Final Action on 
a pending Application 
(E) EFFECT OF .NOTICE Proof that notice was given pursuant to subsections (A) and (B) above is pnma facie 
evidence that notice was properly given If notice given under authonty of this section is not challenged as provided fpr 
under State law within thirty (30) days after the date of the heanng for which the challenged notice was given the 
notice is considered adequate and proper 
(F) OWNERS ASSOCIATION REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 
(1) REGISTRATION Owners associations desinng notice of requests for Building Permits within their boundanes 
must file wntten registration annually with the Park City Building Department and pay an annual fee of fifty dollars 
($50 00) The registration must consist of a copy of the Owners association's Utah State business or corporate 
registration and the name(s), addresses including post office box numbers, and telephone numbers of at least three 
(3) authonzed representatives of the Owners association and a notanzed statement certifying that these individuals 
are the authonzed representatives of said association 
Associations not registered with the City will not be included in the published list of Owners associations and do not 
receive notice of Building Permit requests pnor to their issuance 
Any change(s) in the above information must be forwarded in writing to the Building Department within ten (10) days 
of the change 
(2) NOTICE Pnor to, or at the time of Application for a permit for any Development the Applicant must file with the 
City evidence of notification to the appropnate registered Owners association(s) Acceptable evidence of notification 
shall be the following 
(a) the properly executed notice form, as approved by the City, or 
(b) a signed return receipt from a certified letter posted to the registered association representative with a copy of the 
notice form approved by the City 
(3) CITY NOT PARTY TO DISPUTES The City is not the arbiter of disputes between an Applicant and an Owners 
association Nothing herein shall be interpreted to require Owners association consent prior to City Final Action 
(Amended by Ord Nos 02-57, 06-22) 
15-1 -13 COMPLETION OF SITE IMPROVEMENT WORK PRIOR TO THE APPROVAL OF PLATS OR ISSUANCE 
OF CERTIFICATES OF OCCUPANCY 
fA) POLICY 
(1) SECURITY REQUIRED In order to protect the City from the financial burdens resulting from damage to or 
increased maintenance costs for City facilities that may occur as a result of incomplete or inadequate Site 
improvements on pnvate construction projects, it is the policy of the City to require that Developers either complete all 
Site improvements pnor to occupancy or if that is not possible, that adequate financial secunty for that completion, 
together with a nght of entry to the Property to complete that work be granted to the City It is specifically the intention 
of the City to require that storm drainage work, paving curb and gutter, utility facilities, soil retention Structure, and 
landscaping as needed to control erosion be completed according to standards adopted by the City so that residents 
and taxpayers at large are not required to pay the costs of damage repair or disproportionately increased 
maintenance for roads, storm drainage, or other utility facilities No plat will be approved where required, and no 
Certificate of Occupancy granted unless and until adequate financial secunty is posted in accordance with this 
section 
(2) NO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES INTENDED It is the intention of the City that this financial secunty given by 
the Developer is limited to a contract between the City and the Developer for the express purpose of providing for the 
protection of City facilities and elimination of conditions which could become public nuisances It is not intended that 
this secunty be available for payment of subcontractors or matenal suppliers in the nature of a surety bond, or that the 
secunty provided become available to the purchasers of Property to correct construction flaws or defects which are 
the fault of the Developer In no event will the funds be used for purposes other than those stated in this section and 
the time and manner of the expenditure and pnontization of work performed shall rest in the sole discretion of the 
Planning, Building and Engmeenng Team 
(B) CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO APPROVED PLANS All construction shall be completed according to the 
approved plans on which the Building permits were issued The approved plans shall also include the Site 
improvements shown on the Site plan For purposes of this Code, the term Site improvements shall include all roads, 
sidewalks, curbs, gutters, drains, drainage works, Grades, walls, landscaping, planting, paving paths and trails, and 
similar improvements as shown on the set of plans on which the final approval and Building permits are based 
Deviations from the approved plans must be approved in advance by the Chief Building Offiaal 
(C) SECURITY FOR COMPLETION No Certificate of Occupancy will be issued, nor any plat approved when plats 
are required by this Code, unless the Building and all required Site improvements are completed, or the Developer 
has provided adequate secunty to Guarantee completion of the Site improvements When the Site improvements and 
the Building cannot be completed simultaneously due to weather conditions or other factors beyond the control of the 
Developer, excluding financial inability to complete the project, the City may grant plat approval for recording and/or 
issue Certificates of Occupancy for the project provided the following conditions are met 
(1) The Building or Buildings, or portions thereof, on the Property to be platted or occupied have been constructed in 
accordance with the approved plans for those Buildings and are in full compliance with applicable Building and fire 
codes, and are completed to the extent that only extenor Site improvement work remains unfinished, and 
(2) The Building Offiaal determines that occupancy of the Buildings, or portions thereof pnor to completion of required 
Site improvements is safe and that Access for emergency vehicles is adequate with the Site improvements unfinished, 
and. 
(3) The Developer posts adequate secunty for the benefit of the City to insure completion of the Site improvements in 
full compliance with the approved plans within one (1) year from the date of plat approval if required, or issuance of 
the Certificate of Occupancy, whichever occurs first 
(D) AMOUNT QF SECURITY The amount of the secunty to be posted by the Applicant and shall be equal to 125% 
of the amount reasonably estimated by the Engmeenng Department as being necessary to complete remaining Site 
improvements as shown on the approved plans In the event that the Developer disputes the cost estimate of the City, 
the Developer may prove a lower construction cost by providing binding contracts between the Developer and 
contractor or subcontractor appropnate to perform the required work as a stated, fixed pnce These contracts must be 
supported by a 100% performance bond, insunng performance by the subcontractor or contractor Bid proposals are 
not satisfactory for this purpose If the contracts submitted are acceptable in form, the amount of secunty required 
shall be 125% of the total contract pnce of all such contracts submitted, plus the estimated reasonable cost of 
performing any work not covered by the contracts Speafications in such contracts shall be suffiaently clear to identify 
the work called for under the contract 
(E) TERMS OF SECURITY The terms of any secunty arrangement offered to the City shall state a date certain by 
which the Developer agrees to have Site improvement work completed in accordance with the plans and further 
provide that in the event that the Developer has not completed required Site improvement work by that date the City 
may at its option and on its schedules, draw on the funds in escrow or credit established or such other secunty 
device by its own act and shall not be required to obtain consent of Developer to withdraw funds for completion fo the 
work shown on approved plans The City's actual costs in administenng the completion of work in the event of a 
default by the Developer shall be reimbursed from the escrow or other secunty arrangements 
(F) FQRM._QF SECURITY Secunty arrangements offered in lieu of simultaneous completion of Buildings and Site 
improvements shall be in an amount fixed under the terms of Section 15 1-13(D) herein and shall be in one or more 
of the following forms 
(1) An irrevocable letter of credit from a bank authonzed to do Business in the State of Utah naming Park City 
Municipal Corporation as the payee of funds drawn against that letter of credit and Guaranteeing the availability of 
funds for one (1) y e a r . or, 
(2) A deposit of cash with a third party escrow, or, 
(3) An Agreement with the construction lender providing that the tender will withhold funds in the construction loan in 
an amount equal to the amount calculated in Section 15-1-13(D), above, and will disburse those funds only with the 
wntten consent of the City, and only for the completion of Site improvements As Site improvement work is completed, 
the City will consent to the disbursement of the funds set aside by the lender 
(4) Some combination of the above as approved by the City 
(G) RETAINED AMOUNT The amount in excess of the actual construction costs, but in no event more than twenty 
five percent (25%) of the actual construction cost, shall be held for a penod of one (1) year following final inspection 
and approval of the Site improvement work by the City No retained amount shall be held for landscaping 
improvements once the installation of the required matenals has been approved by the City The retained amount may 
be provided in any of the ways descnbed in LMC Section 15-1-13(F) herein If the Developer fails to provide new 
secunty instruments within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the security instruments provided for the initial 
construction under Section 15-1-13(F), the City shall make a demand or draw on that secunty to the extent of the 
required retained amount, and hold the proceeds in cash until and unless other adequate secunty, as provided in this 
Code, is posted by the Developer The retained amount will be used to replace or repair any Site improvements which 
fail or appear to be defective dunng the one (1) year penod The corrective work may be done by the City or the 
Developer At the completion of that work, the retained amount or so much of it remains shall be released Retained 
amounts may be drawn and applied to any outstanding fees owed by the Developer to the City provided that such 
fees are imposed by ordinance and the amount of the fees is not contested by the Developer 
(H) MODIFICATION OF PLANS A Developer may, at its option, request modifications to plans covenng Site 
improvement work by submitting revised plans to the City for review and action Until the revised plans have received 
approval by the City, the Developer shall be required to offer security for the performance of the Site improvement 
work as shown on the last set of plans to have received City approval Upon acceptance of revised plans by the 
Departments, the City shall release any cash, credit or other secunty held, which is in excess of 125% of the 
completion cost, estimated, of work shown on the most recently revised plan If the modification of the plans increases 
the cost of required Site improvements, additional secunty must be provided by the Developer to cover the increased 
costs 
(I) PAYMENT OF INTEREST Any interest accruing on funds in escrow shall, unless expended for completion of Site 
improvements required, mure to the benefit of the Developer upon release and not to the City, and the City shall not 
be required to pay interest to the Developer on any funds in escrow for this purpose 
(J) DETAILED SITE PLANS A detailed Site plan shall be presented showing the location and nature of drainage 
works, Grade changes, retaining walls, and landscaping, together with any trails paths or walkways that may be 
included or required under other provisions of the Land Management Code 
(K) SINGLE FAMILY HOMES This provision shall apply to all construction in Park City including single family 
homes, provided, however, that the amount of secunty requned for single family homes shall be the reasonably 
estimated cost to complete construction of any retained amount of drainage works on a labor and matenals basis, and 
the estimated cost to complete landscaping to the extent necessary to hold the soil in place on the basis of matenals 
only 
(L) PJH|ASED_JF!RQJECXS Site improvements applicable to each phase of a phased project or Development shall be 
completed or secunty for completion provided as each phase is constructed and either platted or occupied Site 
improvements on other phases of the project shall be completed or secunty offered as those phases are completed 
(Amended by Ord Nos 02-07, 06-22) 
15-1 -14. TERMINATION OF PROJECTS FOR INACTION 
Recognizing the length of the planning review process will vary with the size and complexity of each proposal. 
Applicants must move their projects either to approval or denial in a reasonably expeditious manner The City may 
formally deny Applications which remain inactive for long penods of time due to acts or omissions of the Applicant 
(A) TERMINATION OF APPLICATIONS When the Planning Director finds an Application to be inactive, the Planning 
Director may deny the Application and close the files with respect to that project No Application shall be denied on the 
basis of Inaction without giving fourteen (14) days wntten notice to the Applicant Such notice must state the intent of 
the Planning Director to have the project denied because of Inaction and the nght to contest said denial to the 
Planning Commission 
Delays occasioned by the City shall not constitute cause for terminating an Application 
(B) REINSTATEMENT An Applicant may appeal the Planning Director's denial of a project for Inaction to the 
Planning Commission in the same manner as any other Appeal The Planning Commission may reinstate subject to 
payment of full or partial submission fees, reinstate subject to specific ordinance changes, or deny reinstatement If 
reinstatement is denied, the Application is considered formally denied If the Applicant desires to proceed with the 
project, the Applicant must submit a new Application and pay new submission fees, and the new Application shall be 
subject to all ordinances then in effect 
(Amended by Ord No 06-22) 
15-1 -15. PENALTIES 
Any Person, firm, partnership, or corporation, and the pnncipals or Agents thereof violating or causing the violation of 
this LMC shall be guilty of a Class "C" misdemeanor and punished upon conviction by a fine and/or impnsonment 
descnbed in the current Park City Cnminal Code In addition, the City shall be entitled to bnng a civil acton to enjoin 
and/or abate the continuation of the violation 
Pnvate citizens of Park City or Property Owners have the nght to file actions to enjoin the continuation of a violation 
affecting their interests, provided that the plaintiff in such action gives notice of the action to the City Recorder pnor to 
filing the action 
15-1 -16. LICENSING 
Licenses or permits issued in violation of this LMC are null and void 
15-1 -17. VESTING 
(A) (1) An Applicant is entitled to approval of a land Use Application if the Application conforms to the requirements of 
an applicable land Use ordinance in effect when a complete Application is submitted and all fees have been paid, 
unless: 
(a) the land Use authority, on the record, finds that a compelling, countervailing public interest would be jeopardized 
by approving the Application, or 
(b) in the manner provided by local ordinance and before the Application is submitted, the municipality has formally 
initiated proceedings to amend its ordinances in a manner that would prohibit approval of the Applicaiton as 
submitted. 
(2) The municipality shall process an Application without regard to proceedings initiated to amend the municipality's 
ordinances if. 
(a) 180 days have pased since the proceedings were initiated; and 
(b) the proceedings have not resulted in an enactment that prohibits approval of the Application as submitted. 
(3) An Application for a land Use approval is considered submitted and complete when the Application is provided in 
a form that complies with the the requirements of applicable ordinances and all applicable fees have been paid. 
(4) The continuing validity of an approval of a land Use Application is conditioned upon the Applicant proceeding after 
approval to implement the approval with reasonable diligence. 
(B) A municipality is bound by the terms and standards of applicable land Use ordinances and shall comply with 
mandatory provisions of those ordinances. 
(Amended by Ord. No. 06-22) 
15-1 -18. APPEALS AND RECONSIDERATION PROCESS. 
(A) STAFF. Any decision by the Planning Director regarding Application of this LMC to a Property may be appealed 
to the Planning Commission. Decisions regarding compliance with the Historic District Guidelines may be appealed to 
the Historic Preservation Board. The Appeal must be filed with the Planning Department. There shall be no additional 
notice for Appeal of the staff determination other than listing the matter on the agenda, unless notice of the staff 
review was provided in which case the same notice must be given for the Appeal. 
(B) HISTORIC PRESERVATION BOARD (HPB). Final Actions by the Historic Preservation Board may be appealed 
to the Board of Adjustment 
(C) PLANNING COMMISSION. Final Actions by the Planning Commission on staff Appeals may be appealed to the 
Board of Adjustment Final Action by the Planning Commission on Conditional U*se Permits and MPDs may be 
appealed to the City Council. Only those decisions in which the Planning Commisiosn has applied a land Use 
ordinance to a particular Application, Person, or Parcel may be appealed to an appeal authority. 
(D) STANDING TO APPEAL. The following has standing to appeal a Final Action: 
(1) Any Person who submitted written comment or testified on a proposal before the Planning Department, Historic 
Preservation Board or Planning Commission; 
(2) The Owner of any Property within three hundred feet (300') of the boundary of the subject Site; 
(3) Any City official, Board or Commission having jurisdiction over the matter, and 
(4) The Owner of the subject Property. 
(E) TIMING. All Appeals must be made within ten (10) calendar days of the Final Action. The reviewing body, with the 
consultation of the appellant, shall set a date for the Appeal. 
(F) FORM OF APPEALS. Appeals to the Planning Commission or Board of Adjustment must be filed with the 
Planning Department. Appeals to the City Council must be filed with the City Recorder. Appeals must be by letter or 
petition, and must contain the name, address, and telephone number of the petitioner, his or her relationship to the 
project or subject Property; and must have a comprehensive statement of all the reasons for the Appeal, including 
specific provisions of the law, if known, that are alleged to be violated by the action taken. The Applicant shall pay the 
applicable fee established by resolution. The adversly affected party shall present to the appeal authority every theory 
of relief that it can raise in district court. 
(G) BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. The appeal authority shall act in a quasi-judicial manner. 
The appellant has the burden of proving that the land Use authority erred. Except for appeals to the Board of 
Adjustment the appeal authority shall review factual matters de novo and it shall determine the correctness of a 
decision of the land Use authority in its interpretation and Application of a land Use ordinance. 
(H) WRITTEN FINDINGS REQUIRED. The Appellate Body shall direct Staff to prepare detailed written: 
(1) Findings of Fact which explain and support the Staff decision; 
(2) Conclusions as to how a contrary decision would violate the provisions of this LMC, other City ordinances, or 
applicable state or federal laws or regulations. 
(I) CITY COUNCIL ACTION ON APPEALS. 
(1) The City Council, with the consultation of the Appellant, shall set a date for the Appeal. 
(2) The City Recorder shall notify the Owner of the Appeal date. The City Recorder shall obtain the findings, 
conclusions and all other pertinent information from the Planning Department and shall transmit them to the Council. 
(3) The City Council may affirm, reverse, or affirm in part and reverse in part any property appealed decision of the 
Planning Commission. The City Council may remand the matter to the appropriate body with directions for specific 
Areas of review or clarification. City Council review of petitions of Appeal shall be limited to consideration of only those 
matters raised by the petition(s), unless the Council by motion, enlarges the scope of the Appeal to accept information 
on other matters. 
(4) Staff must prepare written findings within fifteen (15) working days of the City Council vote on the matter. 
(J) CITY COUNCIL CALL-UP. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of Final Action on any project, the City Council, on its 
own motion, may call any Final Action taken by the Planning Commission or Planning Director up for review by the 
Council. The call-up shall require the majority vote of the Council. Notice of the call-up shall be given to the Chairman 
of the Planning Commission and/or Planning Director by the Recorder, together with the date set by the Council for 
consideration of the merits of the matter. The Recorder shall also provide notice as required by Section 15-1 -12 
herein. In calling a matter up, the Council may limit the scope of the call-up hearing to certain issues, and need not 
take public input at the hearing. The City Council, with the consultation of the Applicant shall set a date for the call-up. 
The City Recorder shall notify the Applicant of the call-up date. The City Recorder shall obtain the findings, and all 
other pertinent information and transmit them to the Council. 
(K) NOTICE Nobce of all Appeals to City Council or call ups shall be given by 
(1) Publishing the matter once at least seven (7) days pnor to the hearing in a newspaper having general circulation in 
Park City and 
(2) By mailing courtesy notice seven (7) days pnor to the hearing to all parties who received mailed courtesy notice for 
the onginal action 
(L) STAY OF APPROVAL PENDING REVIEW OF APPEAL Upon the filing of an Appeal any approval granted by 
the Histonc District Commission or the Planning Commission will be suspended until the City Council has acted on the 
Appeal 
(M) APPEAL FROM THE CITY COUNCIL The Applicant or any Person aggneved by City action on the project may 
Appeal from the Final Action by the City Council affecting the project to a court of competent junsdiction The deasion 
of the Council stands and those affected by the decision may act in reliance on it unless and until the court enters an 
interlocutory or final order modifying the decision 
(N) FINALITY OF ACTION Final Action occurs when the deciding body has adopted and executed wntten findings of 
fact and conclusions of law 
(O) RECONSIDERATION The City Council and any Board or Commission may reconsider at any time any 
legislative deasion upon an affirmative vote of a majonty of that body The City Council and any Board or 
Commission may reconsider any quasi judicial deasion upon an affirmative vote of a majonty of that body at any time 
pnor to Final Action Any action taken by the deading body shall not be reconsidered or rescinded at a special 
meeting unless the number of members of the deading body present at the special meeting is equal to or greater than 
the number of members present at the meeting when the action was approved * 
(P) No participating member of the appeal panel may entertain an appeal in which he or she acted as the land Use 
authority 
(Amended by Ord No 06 22) 
15 1 -19 CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS REVIEW AND APPEAL 
In order to promote the protection of pnvate Property rights and to prevent the physical taking or exaction of pnvate 
Property without just compensation the City Counal and all Commissions and Boards shall adhere to the following 
before authonzing the seizure or exaction of Property 
(A) TAKINGS REVIEW PROCEDURE Pnor to any proposed action to exact or seize Property by the City the City 
Attorney shall review the proposed action to determine if a constitutional taking requinng just compensationwould 
occur The City Attorney shall review ail such matters pursuant to the guidelines established in subsection (B) below 
Upon identifying a possible constitutional taking the City Attorney shall in a confidential protected wnting inform the 
Council commission or board of the possible consequences of its action This opinion shall be advisory only No 
liability shall be attnbuted to the City for failure to follow the recommendation of the City Attorney 
(B) TAKINGS GUIDELINES The City Attorney shall review whether the acton constitutes a constitutional taking 
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or under Article I Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution The City Attorney shall determine whether the proposed acton bears an essential nexus to a 
legitimate governmental interest and whether the action is roughly proportionate and reasonably related to the 
legitimate governmental interest The City Attorney shall also determine whether the action depnves the pnvate 
Property Owner of all reasonable Use of the Property These guidelines are advisory only and shall not expand nor 
limit the scope of the City s liability for a constitutional taking 
(C) APPEAL Any Owner of pnvate Property who believes that his/her Property is proposed to be "taken" by an 
otherwise Final Action of the City may Appeal the Citys decision to the Takings Appeal Board within thirty (30) days 
after the deasion is made The Appeal must be filed in wnting with the City Recorder The Takings Appeal Board shall 
hear and approve and remand or reject the Appeal within fourteen (14) calendar days after the Appeal is filed The 
Takings Appeal Board with advice from the City Attorney shall review the Appeal pursuant to the guidelines in 
subsection (B) herein The deasion of the Takings Appeal Board shall be in wnting and a copy given to the appellant 
and to the City Counal Commission or Board that took the initial action The Takings Appeal Board s rejection of an 
Appeal constitutes exhaustion of administrative remedies rendenng the matter suitable for appeal to a court of 
competent junsdiction 
(D) TAKINGS APPEAL BOARD There is hereby created a three (3) member Takings Appeal Board The City 
Manager shall appoint three (3) current members of the Board of Adjustment to serve on the Takings Appeal Board If 
at any time three (3) members of the Board of Adjustment cannot meet to satisfy the time requirements stated in 
subsection (C) the City Manager shall appoint a member or suffiaent members to fill the vacancies 
15-1 -20 EXACTIONS 
Exaction or exactions may be imposed on Development proposed in a land Use Application if 
(A) an essential link exists between a legitimate governmental interest and each exaction and 
(B) each exaction is roughly proportionate both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed Development 
(Section created by Ord No 06 22) 
15-1 -21 NOTICE MATRIX 
ACTION: POSTED: 
1 NOTICE MATRIX 
Zoning and 
Rezoning 
LMC Substantive 
Amendments 
General Plan 
Amendments 
Master Planned 
Developments 
(MPD) 
II Appeals of 
Planning 
|| Director, Historic 
Preservation 
Board, or 
Planning 
Commission 
decisions, 
including City 
Council Call-Up 
Conditional Use 
Approval (CUP) 
Timeshare 
11 Conversions 
Variance 
Requests, Non-
conforming Use 
Modifications 
and Appeals to 
Board of 
|| Adjustment 
Certificate of 
Appropriateness 
for Demolition 
(CAD) 
14 days prior to 
each hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council 
14 days prior to 
each hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council. 
14 days prior to 
each hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council. 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission. 
7 days prior to 
the date set for 
the appeal or call-
up hearing. 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission. 
Same as CUP 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
before the Board 
of Adjustment. 
45 days on the 
Property upon 
refusal of the 
City to issue a 
CAD; 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before 
the Historic 
Preservation 
Board. 
COURTESY 
MAILING: 
14 days to each 
affected entity. 
14 days to each 
affected entity. 
14 days to each 
affected entity. 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission, to 
Owners within 500 
ft. 
To all parties who 
received mailed 
notice for the original 
Administrative or 
Planning 
Commission hearing 
7 days prior to the 
hearing. 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission, to 
Owners within 300 
ft. 
Same as CUP 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
Board of Adjustment, 
to owners within 300 
ft. 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
Historic Preservation 
Board, to Owners 
within 300 ft. 
PUBLISHED: 
Once 14 days 
prior to each | 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council. 
Once 14 days 
prior to each 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council. 
Once 14 days 
prior to each 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission and 
City Council. 
Once 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission. 
Once 7 days 
before the date set 
for the appeal or 
call-up hearing. 
Once 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission. 
Same as CUP 
Once 14 days 
prior to hearing 
before the Board 
of Adjustment. 
Once 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before the 
Historic | 
Preservation 
Board. 
II 
II Determination of 
Historic 
|| Significance 
II Historic District 
Design Review 
|| Annexations 
Termination of 
II Project 
Applications 
II Lot Line 
Adjustments: 
Between 2 Lots 
without a plat 
amendment 
|| Preliminary and 
Final Subdivision 
Plat Applications 
Condominium 
Applications; 
Record of Survey 
Plats 
Record of Survey 
Amendments 
Subdivision Plat 
Amendments 
Vacating or 
Changing a 
Street 
Once 7 days prior 
to hearing before 
the Historic 
Preservation 
Board 
For a 10 day 
period once 
Staff=s 
preliminary 
determination of 
compliance has 
been reached 
Varies, depending 
To Owners of 
adjoining Property 
once Staff=s 
preliminary 
determination of 
compliance has been 
reached, establishing 
a 10 day period in 
which Staff=s 
decision may be 
appealed 
. 
Once 7 days prior | 
to hearing before 
the Historic J 
Preservation | 
Board 
Only required 
upon appeal of 
the Planning 
Director's II 
decision See II 
appeals from 
Planning 
Director, Historic 
Preservation 
Board, Planning 
Commission, II 
including City 
Council Call-Up 
on number of Owners and current State | 
law Consult with the Legal Department 
--
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
before the 
Planning 
Commission 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
14 days prior to 
the hearing 
Mailed Notice To 
Owner/Applicant and 
certified Agent by 
certified mail 14 days 
prior to the Planning 
Director=s 
termination and 
closure of files 
To Owners within 
300 ft at time of 
initial Application for 
Lot line adjustment 
Need consent letters, 
as described on the 
Planning Department 
Application form, 
from adjacent 
Owners 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission, to 
Owners within 300 
ft 
14 days prior tq^the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission, to 
Owners within 300 
ft 
14 days prior to the 
hearing, to Owners 
within 300 ft 
14 days prior to the 
hearing, to Owners 
within 300 ft 
14 days prior to the 
hearing before the 
City Council, to 
Owners within 300 
ft and to affected 
entities 
Note For all Applications, notice will be given to the Applicant 
Once 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission 
Once 14 days 
prior to the 
hearing before the 
Planning 
Commission 
Once 14 days 
prior to the II 
hearing || 
Once 14 days II 
prior to the 
hearing 
Once a week for 4 
consecutive 
weeks prior to the 
hearing before the 
City Council 
of date, time, and 
place of the public hearing and public meeting to consider the Application and of || 
1 any Final Action on a pending Application 
Appendix A - Official Zoning Map (Refer to the Planning Department) 
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Robert A. McFadden and RAMAC-Foothills, L.L.C., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Cache County 
Corporation, John Does 1-10, and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20050717-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2006 UT App 256; 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 283 
June 22, 2006, Filed 
NOTICE: [ * 1 ] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: First District, Logan Department, 050100058. The Honorable Clint S. 
Judkins 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In a suit to challenge a zoning decision, plaintiff zoning 
applicant appealed the judgment of the First District, Logan Department, Utah, granting a 
motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, the Cache County Board of Adjustment 
(Utah) and the Cache County Council (the Council). 
OVERVIEW: The zoning applicant failed to file an appeal with the Cache County Board of 
Adjustment after the Cache County Council denied his subdivision plat application. The 
zoning applicant argued that the term "administrative," as used in Utah Code Ann. § 17-
27-703, was ambiguous and that the council's rejection of his subdivision application was 
not an administrative decision subject to appeal to the board. The appellate court 
disagreed. The council's denial of the application was an administrative decision, which 
necessitated an appeal to the board in order to exhaust all administrative remedies. As a 
matter of law, the zoning applicant did not strictly comply with Utah Code Ann. 17-27-
1001(1), which required him to exhaust all administrative remedies. As a result, the trial 
court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed. 
CORE TERMS: administrative remedies, plat, ordinance, summary judgment, exceptional 
circumstances, zoning ordinance, matter of law, new law, exhausting, administrative 
decision, exhaustion requirement, exhausted 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Show Headnotes 
COUNSEL: Christopher L. Daines, Logan, for Appellants 
Craig V. Wentz and Barton H. Kunz I I , Salt Lake City, and N. George Daines, Logan, for 
Appellees 
JUDGES: Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge. WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Judge, Gregory 
K. Orme, Judge 
O P I N I O N : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiffs Robert A. McFadden and RAMAC-Foothills (collectively, McFadden) assert on appeal 
that the trial court improperly granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on 
McFadden's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 
(1) (Supp. 2003) ("No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions . . 
. until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies."), n l McFadden failed to file an 
appeal with the Cache County Board of Adjustment (the Board) after the Cache County 
Council (the Council) denied his subdivision plat application. 
Footnotes 
n l Because there have been substantial amendments to .this code section since this matter 
was filed with the trial court, for ease of reference, we cite throughout this opinion to the 
statutes in effect at the relevant t ime. 
End Footnotes [*2] 
McFadden first asserts that he exhausted all administrative remedies because the Board 
lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Council's denial of his subdivision plat 
application. 
McFadden argues that the term "administrative," as used in Utah Code section 17-27-703, n2 
is ambiguous and that the Council's rejection of McFadden's subdivision application is not an 
administrative decision subject to appeal to the Board. We disagree. 
- Footnotes 
n2 The Board's jurisdiction includes "appeals from administrative decisions applying a zoning 
or subdivision ordinance, including appeals f rom: . . . administrative decisions related to 
subdivision plats." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-703( l ) (a) (2001). 
- End Footnotes 
We "must look to the substance of the . . . council's action to determine if it is legislative or 
administrative. In general, to be legislative, an ordinance must make a new law; to be 
administrative, an ordinance must execute or implement an existing law." Low v. City of 
Monticello, 2002UT 90,„P 24, 54 P.3d 1153 [ * 3 ] (citation omitted); see also Citizen's 
Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah 1994) ("The original enactment of a 
zoning ordinance is usually legislative . . ., while the implementation of that ordinance is 
typically administrative."). Here, the Council's denial of McFadden's plat did not make a new 
law; rather, it implemented or applied county ordinances and policies when it rejected 
McFadden's application. See Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (stating that "the approval of a plat . . . is a decision applying the zoning 
ordinance"). Therefore, the Council's denial of the application was an administrative decision, 
which necessitated an appeal to the Board in order to exhaust all administrative remedies. 
Because McFadden failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, the trial court did not err in 
granting Defendants summary judgment as to this issue. 
Additionally, McFadden asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, no 
exceptional circumstances existed under which McFadden might be excused from exhausting 
administrative remedies. "Exceptions to [exhausting administrative [ * 4 ] remedies] exist in 
unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or 
injustice is occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged 
grievance or where it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Nebeker v. 
Utah State Tax ComnVn, 2001 UT 74, P 14, 34 P.3d 180 Quotat ions and citations omit ted). 
McFadden alleges that Mark Teuscher, an employee of Cache County, incorrectly informed 
him that the Board does not review subdivision plat application appeals and informed him not 
to complete or submit the appeal forms. McFadden argues that Teuscher's incorrect 
information constitutes an exceptional circumstance that excuses him from the exhaustion 
requirement. McFadden admits in his trial court pleadings, however, that "Plaintiffs are not 
claiming that Cache County provided legal advice on which Plaintiffs relied in not filing an 
appeal." We reject McFadden's exceptional circumstances argument because he concedes 
that he did not rely on Teuscher's information in deciding not to appeal. 
Furthermore, as "the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion requirement . . ., we will 
enforce it strictly. [ * 5 ] " Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, P 17, 67 P.3d 466. 
McFadden offers no compelling reason to rule otherwise. Therefore, we hold that, as a matter 
of law, McFadden did not strictly comply with section 17-27-1001(1). As a result, the trial 
court did not err in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, we aff irm. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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